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Recent Developments

Thompson v. State:
Jury Instructions Cannot Substantially Deviate from the American Bar
Association's Criminal Justice Standards of the Maryland Pattern
Jury Instructions
By: Edward Goodman
he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held jury
instructions cannot substantially
deviate from the American Bar
Association's Criminal Justice
Standards ofthe Maryland Pattern
Jury Instructions. Thompson v.
State, 371 Md. 473, 485, 810A.2d
435,442 (2002). The court found
the trial judge erred in instructing the
jury with an "attitude of jurors"
instruction, rather than the "duty to
deliberate" instruction, as required
by the Maryland Pattern Jury
Instruction 2: 0 1. Id.
During a search of the
defendant's residence, pursuant to
a search warrant, officers recovered
marijuana, cash, and drug paraphernalia. Thompson was arrested
and while in custody admitted the
marijuana was for personal use,
although he sometimes sold it to his
friends. Thompson was indicted for
possession with intent to distribute
a controlled dangerous substance,
possession of controlled paraphernalia, and possession of a
controlled and dangerous substance.
Thompson was convicted in
the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County on all charges. He appealed
to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland alleging the judge erred in
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allowing a midtrial amendment to the
indictment. In addition, Thompson
claimed the judge improperly
substituted the requisite "duty to
deliberate" jury instruction with an
improper "attitude of jury" instruction. The court of special
appeals affirmed Thompson's
conviction.
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari to
determine the legality ofthe midtrial
amendment to the indictment and
the significance of the trial judge
altering the jury instructions with a
personalized jury deliberation
instruction.
First, the court addressed
whether the trial judge violated
Maryland Rule 4-325 by instructing
the jury with what he called the
"attitude ofjury" instruction rather
than the required "duty to
deliberate" from the Maryland
Pattern Jury Instructions. Id at 47879, 810 A.2d at 438-39.
Thompson argued the segment of
the jury instruction that read, "the
'final test' of the quality of your
service will lie in the verdict which
you return to the court, not in the
opinions any of you may hold as you
retire" did not reasonably adhere to
the ABA standards approved by the
court of appeals. Id at 479, 810

A.2d at 439.
The court of appeals examined the appropriate language ofthe
instructions given to a deliberating
jury in Kelly v. State. Id. at 480,
810 A.2d at 440. The court
adopted the American Bar
Association's Criminal Justice
Standard to measure the appropriateness of the "duty to deliberate" jury instructions. Id. at
480-81, 810 A.2d at 440 (citing
Kelly v. State, 270 Md. 139,310
A.2d 538 (1973)).
The Kelly court approved a
specific instruction to be used by
judges before a jury begins deliberations. Thompson, 371 Md. at
482, 810 A.2d at 441. The court
referred to this instruction as an
Allen-type jury charge because of
its modified language and the
recognition that judges may
personalize jury instructions as long
as they reasonably adhere to the
ABA standards. Id at 482, 810
A.2d at 441. An Allen charge
encouraged deadlocked jurors to
reach a verdict by stressing
deference of the minority jurors to
the views ofthe majority. Id. It was
derived from an instruction
approved by the United States
Supreme Court. Id. (citing Allen
v. United States, 164 U.S. 492,
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17 S.Ct. 154 (1896)).
In Maryland, the court noted
an Allen charge may not be used
on a deadlocked jury because it
does not adhere to ABA standards.
Id. The court stated it was coercive
and an impermissible interference
with the function of the jury. Id. In
addition, it encouraged minority
jurors to acquiesce to the views of
the majority. Thompson, 371 Md.
at 482, 810 A.2d at 441 (citing
Burnette v. State, 280 Md. 88,371
A.2d 663 (1997). Further, the court
found Allen instructions given
before jury deliberations are just as
coercive as the instructions given to
deadlocked jurors. Id. at 484,810
A.2d at 442 (citing Goodmuth v.
State, 302 Md. 613, 490A.2d 682
(1985)).
In the instant case, the court
held some portions ofthe judge's
"attitude ofjurors" instruction gave
deference to the ABA standards,
but there were substantial
deviations.ld. at 485,810 A.2d at
442. The trial court's "final test" jury
instruction suggests to jurors that
collective judgment is more important than adherence to individual
principles and honest convictions.
Id. at 486-87, 810 A.2d at 443.
This concept was found to be
coercive and an obstacle to a jury's
function.ld. at 483, 810 A.2d at
441. It implies there is a standard
of service to which a good juror
should aspire, one that requires a
verdict be reached rather than an
adherence to his or her own personal beliefs and judgments. Id. at
486, 810 A.2d at 443.
Next, the court addressed the
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issue of whether a midtrial amendment to the indictment had double
jeopardy implications. Thompson,
371 Md. at 487,810 A.2d at 444.
The court found a mid-trial
amendment is problematic when it
changes the nature of the offense.
Id. at 487 -88, 810 A.2d at 444.
The purpose of an indictment
is to provide notice to the accused
of the charges and to guard against
the possibility of unfair surprises at
trial. Id. at 488, 810 A.2d at 444.
Adequate notice is given when the
charging document contains both a
characterization ofthe crime and the
particular act alleged to have been
committed.ld. at 489,810 A.2d at
445.
In the present case, the court
noted, under Maryland Rule 4202(a), a citation of authority error
in an indictment is not grounds for
dismissal or reversal of a conviction.
Id. The statutory reference existed
as a matter of convenience to the
parties and possessed no substance
of its own. Id. Accordingly, the
body of the indictment determines
the character ofthe offense and not
the statutory reference. Thompson,
371 Md. at 489, 810A.2d at 445.
By changing the indictment from a
violation of Md. Code Ann.,
[possession of controlled
paraphernalia] § 287 A (1957,1996
Repl. Vol.) to Md. Code Ann.,
[possession of controlled paraphernalia with intent to distribute] §
287(d)(2)(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.)
the state did not change the
character of the offense, and
therefore, the midtrial amendment
was not a double jeopardy violation.

Id. at 489,810 A.2d at 445.
The court of appeal's holding
in Thompson supports the right of
a defendant to have his or her jury
instructions adhere to ABA standards. The ABA standards, of the
Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions,
were adopted to provide guidance.
The court clearly articulated judges
may personalize jury instructions,
especially prior to deliberations, as
long as they adhere to these
standards. This ruling is significant
to Maryland attorneys because it
shows there are limits to how far a
judge can deviate from established
jury instruction standards. It
demonstrates that jurors should not
surrender their honest convictions in
order to return a verdict. Individual
principles and honest opinions
should always prevail over the
primacy of collective judgment.

